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Situation-aware Authenticated Video Broadcasting
over Train-trackside WiFi Networks
Yongdong Wu, Dengpan Ye, Zhuo Wei, Qian Wang, William Tan, and Robert H. Deng, Fellow IEEE
Abstract—Live video programmes can bring in better travel
experience for subway passengers and earn abundant advertise-
ment revenue for subway operators. However, because the train-
trackside channels for video dissemination are easily accessible
to anyone, the video traffic are vulnerable to attacks which may
cause deadly tragedies.
This paper presents a situation-aware authenticated video
broadcasting scheme in the railway network which consists
of train, on-board sensor, trackside GSM-R (Global System
for Mobile Communications-Railway) device, WiFi AP (Access
Point), and train control center. Specifically, the scheme has
four modules: (1) a train uses its on-board sensors to obtain its
speed, location, and RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indicator)
of train-trackside WiFi channel; (2) the train reports these
real-time measurements to the railway control center with the
legacy GSM-R networks; (3) according to the measurements,
the control center or its WiFi AP adaptively customizes the
protected codestream bitrate and AP-train handover time; (4)
the train renders the received codestream which passes the
authenticity verification process. As shown in the performance
analysis, the present scheme ensures the codestream authenticity
and provides high QoS (Quality of Service) in the lossy subway
WiFi environment.
Index Terms—Situation-aware; Streaming authentication; S-
calable Video Coding; Subway WiFi.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a daily transportation means for a large amount of pas-
sengers in many cities [1], by nature subway is an important
area for broadcasting multimedia programmes, government
notices, commercial advertisements, etc. However, since a
video codestream delivered over wireless channel is usually
erroneous in subway environments [2]–[4], most of subway
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providers only serve pre-recorded video which are replayed
on the trains. Apparently, this kind of offline services is not
satisfactory as it can not render real-time programmes such
as live sports games. Although 3G/4G/5G mobile networks
enable to provide real-time multimedia broadcast services [5],
the subway operators have to pay the subscription fee and
rely on the telco all the time. Therefore, they would prefer to
broadcasting video programmes with their own WiFi (or other
spectrum-free) networks.
The subway video dissemination over WiFi networks must
guarantee video authenticity as safety is always the first prior-
ity in subway services. Unfortunately, subway is an “ideal”
target for attackers such as terrorists in Moscow subway
tragedy [6]. As an example of practical threats, when an
unprotected multimedia is disseminated over a public network,
an adversary is able to tamper with the broadcast system to
cause riots or bad effects [7]. When a video is distributed over
a WiFi network, this kind of cyber-attack becomes possible
theoretically [8] and practically [9].
The subway video dissemination over WiFi shall guarantee
high QoS (Quality of Service) too. Clearly, if the quality
of advertisement video is too low to satisfy the passengers,
the subway operators will suffer from revenue loss. The
degradation of the video QoS may be due to some factors:
(1) interference sources (e.g., train movement, random noise,
and signal fading) which incur packet errors [10]–[13]; (2)
Handover delay which leads to the poor performance or
instability of communicating quality in mobile applications.
When a train moves from the coverage of one AP (Access
point) to the coverage of another, it usually has to carry on a
handover process which may take up to 500ms [14] such that
many video frames may lose or include artifacts.
This paper presents a novel legacy-compatible method
which ensures high quality and authenticity of live video
broadcasting in a lossy subway environment. In the proposed
scheme, an operation center creates a trusted SVC (Scalable
Video Code) codestream, broadcasts it to all the APs on the
subway lines. According to the measured train location, speed
and WiFi signal quality, each AP adaptively tunes WiFi bitrate
and optimally truncates codestream such that the passing-by
trains can receive the video of high quality in real-time. Based
on the performance analysis, the present scheme is able to
protect any innocent train even if all APs and other trains
are compromised, and provide a satisfactory video broadcast
service in the harsh subway WiFi environments. The strengthes
of the present scheme are as follows.
• High compatibility with legacy rail transportation in-
frastructure. The present scheme employs the existing
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video broadcast system, on-board sensors and track-side
GSM-R communication systems to provide codestream
authenticity and high QoS.
• Optimal authenticity rate according to real-time RSSI
(Received Signal Strength Indicator) of the train-AP
channel. As train-AP RSSI is readily measured by the
train and sent to AP via the operation center, the AP
is able to optimize the video delivery in terms of WiFi
bitrate and FEC (Forward Error Correcting) code.
• Situation-aware handover for improving authentication
rate and quality of service according to RSSI and train-AP
distance. As train’s state information (such as location,
speed and moving direction) and AP location information
are easily available in the railway system, the new AP can
be determined in advance. Therefore, similar to GSM-
R (Global System for Mobile Communications-Railway)
handover [15], the WiFi handover time is shortened
significantly such that the AP-train connectivity remains
stable at handover time.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces the related work on WiFi networks, SVC
streaming authentication, and train video broadcast. Section
III elaborates the novel authenticated video streaming over
train-trackside communication channels. Section IV introduces
situation-aware optimization of streaming authentication pro-
cess. Section V analyzes the present scheme. Finally, Section
VI addresses the conclusion and future works.
II. RELATED WORK
In order to deliver a trusted video in a harsh subway
environment, it is necessary to ensure error-resilience of WiFi
communication, and authenticity of scalable video codestream
in the train video broadcast system.
A. WiFi Communication
IEEE 802.11 or WiFi standard specifies different data rates
over wireless channels [16]. Although a higher data rate
means more emitted signals per second, the actual throughput
may be lower because higher data rate may incur more
transmission errors and demand more retransmissions [17]. As
one part of IEEE 802.11 standard to reduce retransmissions,
DRS (Dynamic Rate Switching) enables both mobile devices
and APs to negotiate data rate based on some information,
e.g., RSSI which represents the relationship between sending
signal power and receiving power [18] [19]. Although DRS is
critical to WiFi performance, its implementation mechanism
is unspecified in IEEE 802.11 standards.
An enterprise WiFi network [20] enables users to roam
among different regions of the enterprise building. Due to
the restriction of WiFi AP coverage, multiple APs are needed
to cover a larger building, multiple floors, outdoor areas etc.
As an enterprise WiFi network is designed for high signal-
noise-ratio and low speed applications, its technology may be
applicable to vehicular opportunistic access [21], rather than
video dissemination in the harsh subway WiFi network.
Unlike the low-speed mobile device, a moving train has to
realize quick handover which enables the train to switch the
connectivity from an old AP to a new AP within a tolerable
period, in order to provide the illusion of continuous WiFi
connectivity. Whenever there is a handover, there is a QoS
degradation risk due to packet delay and dropping. Hence fast
handover [22]–[24] or even handover-free [25] technologies
have been intensively investigated for high mobility perfor-
mance. In particular, location-aware handover schemes are
attractive as they are able to reduce handover time by exchang-
ing communication context among neighboring APs [26]–
[28]. Nonetheless, handover is still one of major challenging
factors for real-time video delivery in dynamic and hostile
environments.
B. SVC Codestream and its Authenticity
In a harsh subway environment, the WiFi connectivity
between train and AP varies with train location, speed, and
surround conditions. If the bitrate of a codestream is constant
and the WiFi signal is weak, some video data can not be
delivered properly. Hence, it is valuable to directly reduce
the video codestream bitrate as the process of codestream
decoding and re-encoding is time-consuming at the AP side.
1) SVC codestream structure: SVC enables “encode once,
decode many ways”, i.e., its codestream can be directly
truncated into many sub-codestreams without re-encoding. As
shown in Fig. 1, an SVC codestream consists of NALUs
(Network Abstract Layer Unit) which includes a 3-bit field
NRI signalling importance of the NALU. The NALUs can
be classified into VCL (Video Coding Layer) NALU and
Non-VCL NALU. A VCL NALU has a payload field for
the compressed visual data, while a Non-VCL NALU has
an Auxiliary payload field for decoding (e.g., SVC header in
prefix NALU). A VCL NALU has two kinds of structures.
One has an SVC header itself, while another has to form a
pair with a prefix Non-VCL NALU whose auxiliary payload is
an SVC header. An SVC header includes PRID (Priority IDen-
tifier), DID (Dependency IDentifier), QID (Quality IDentifier)
and TID (Temporal IDentifier) which are used for different
codestream reduction methods [29].
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Fig. 1. The structure of SVC bitstream. The dash box means that some VCL
NALU shall follow a prefix Non-VCL NALU [29].
2) SVC authenticity: As introduced in Section I, video
broadcast on the train may be tampered with by a malicious
attacker. A naı¨ve way to thwart illegal manipulation is to
treat multimedia bitstream as non-structural data, authentically
encrypt them as a whole, and distribute the ciphertext bit-
stream. However, this approach is not suitable for multimedia
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broadcast in the subway as the bitrate of delivered codestream
shall be adaptive to the lossy network environment.
Up to now, there are many authenticated video streaming
schemes which can be classified into three categories: cryp-
tographic authentication, watermarking-based authentication
and content-based authentication [30]. Cryptographic authen-
tication techniques employ cryptography primitives such as
digital signature or MAC (Message Authentication Code)
to ensure data authenticity [31]–[33]; Watermarking-based
authentication schemes embed a reference object (e.g., image
or message) into an SVC codestream. As the reference object
and the SVC codestream are mixed together, the embedded
reference object will be manipulated if the SVC codestream
is maliciously tampered with [34]; In a content-based authenti-
cation scheme, a content provider extracts multimedia features,
generates a reference object with the extracted features, and
delivers the reference object to end users via a secure channel
such that the receiver is able to verify the received multimedia
against the secured reference object [35]. However, they are
designed for authenticated video streaming to stationary nodes,
rather than mobile nodes.
C. Video Broadcasting on Train
In many railway broadcast systems, the video programmes
are pre-loaded into the train and then replayed when the train
is on-duty. This pre-recorded mode provides the best quality of
services. However, its impact is not significant as passengers
are often uninterested in “old” messages.
Presently, some railway systems offer non-reliable live
programmes over train-trackside WiFi networks, as shown
in Fig.2. Although unequal error protection [36], layer-aware
FEC [37], and layer-mixed FEC [38] technologies are able to
increase the robustness of network communications, the video
QoS is yet not guaranteed as they are not customized for the
error-prone railway network environments.
Fig. 2. An non-authenticated image captured from a screen of a real subway
video system.
More seriously, the subway video delivery system is lack
of security protection such that it is vulnerable to deadly
attacks due to: (1) a video broadcast system is localized
in an open area and easy to be physically manipulated by
attackers; (2) Subway wireless signals are publicly accessible
and easy to be manipulated by anyone with a WiFi transceiv-
er; (3) Multimedia are broadcast in plaintext in some real
subways in order to avoid the complicated cryptography key
management and compatibility problem existing between the
video decoders from different suppliers; (4) broadcast system
designers focus on reducing handover time and packet loss
rate [39], worry about protection methods which may add
overhead and propagate the packet errors; and believe that
the subway is physically secure as the operator controls the
subway infrastructure.
III. ON-BOARD AUTHENTICATED VIDEO BROADCASTING
On-board video programme services are beneficial to both
passengers and subway operators, and hence become more
and more popular in subway trains. This Section presents an
on-board authenticated video broadcast system in a railway
network.
A. System Diagram
As shown in Fig.3, a railway network consists of trains
equipped with sensors, WiFi communication sub-systems,
GSM-R communication sub-systems and an operation cen-
ter. Each train communicates with the center via WiFi AP
and GSM-R base station which are installed on the subway
trackside. As GSM-R is the important train-trackside com-
munication sub-system of a modern subway transport system
such as ETCS (European Train Control System) [40], both
WiFi APs and GSM-R stations can be installed simultaneously
such that the total installation cost is small. Here, the GSM-
R communication is bi-directional for train states while WiFi
communication is unidirectional for video broadcasting.
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Fig. 3. System diagram, where the WiFi network and GSM-R network exist
in the current subway infrastructure. Here, GSM-R is used to represent all the
communication systems including LTE-R (Long-Term Evolution - Railway),
TETRA (TErrestrial TRunked Radio) etc.
B. Security Model
In a subway system, WiFi APs may be manipulated by an
attacker because they are installed in unprotected open areas.
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Additionally, the attacker is also able to insert faked multime-
dia by hijacking the WiFi channels. Hence, to guarantee the
authenticity of the broadcast multimedia, only the producer at
the operation center is assumed to be trustworthy, but APs and
trains may be vulnerable to attacks such as man-in-the-middle
attack. In this paper, we ignore denial of service attack and/or
channel jamming.
In addition, the sensors for train location, speed, and RSSI
are assumed to be trusted, and hence their readings can be used
as trusted sources (within tolerable error ranges) for optimizing
the video dissemination.
C. Authenticated Video Broadcasting Scheme
In order to ensure the authenticity of the codestream sent
from an operation center to a train, the center will create an
authenticated codestream which will be broadcast to the WiFi
APs. Each AP will adaptively truncate the codestream and
prepare the authentication tokens. After receiving the truncated
bitstream, the passing-by train will verify and decode it. The
generic authentication process is similar to the cryptographic
stream authentication scheme [30] [31], except that the low-
cost symmetric key management and codestream truncation
are customized for the subway system.
1) Overview of on-board video broadcasting: As shown
in Fig.4, when a train is on duty, it periodically measures
its location and speed using the on-board sensors, and then
uploads the measurements to the train center via GSM-R
base stations. Afterwards, the center continuously broadcasts
the states of all the trains to the APs, as well as video
codestreams. If a train is within the coverage of an AP, the
AP will customize the video codestream according to RSSI,
train speed and train location, and broadcast the customized
codestream. After receiving the customized codestream, the
passing-by train will verify and render them on the on-board
screen.
 
4. Customized 
codestream 
3. Train state, 
codestream 
2. Train state  
1.Train state  
Video source 
GSM-R station 
 Center 
WiFi AP
Train
Measured location, speed etc 
Fig. 4. Workflow for video streaming over train-trackside WiFi Network.
2) Train-wise key generation: In order to ensure over-the-
air security of GSM-R communication, a train and the control
center share a secret kGSM in the legacy communication
system. By re-using the shared key, a key for the codestream
authentication can be generated as
kTid = H(kGSM |Tid) (1)
is generated at both the center and the train for video au-
thentication, where H(·) is a one-way function. As the train
keys are independent among the trains, an attacker is unable to
attack the decoder of one train by compromising the decoder
of another.
3) Creating codestream at center: A video can be encoded
into different SVC codestreams but identical visual content
by ordering the NALUs based on PRID, DID, QID and TID
in different ways. The unique requirement for the ordering
is: ∀i, j, if NALU Ui is directly or indirectly used to create
NALU Uj (i.e., if NALU Ui is missing, the decoding of NALU
Uj fails), i < j. Thus, as shown in Fig.5, the NALUs can
be classified into different priority levels according to their
dependency relationship. Those NALUs within the same level
form a quality level. By experiment or experience, the center
is able to select the number of priorities in advance.
A1 A2 
B1 B2 B3 B4
C1 C2
Level 1 
Level 2 
Level 3 
Fig. 5. NALU priority levels. Each eclipse represents an NALU.
In order to reduce the communication overhead for authen-
ticity, the center will divide a video codestream into groups
including the constant number of frames each. Assume a group
G is encoded into l NALUs Ui, i = 1, 2, . . . , l. Then, its
progressive hash hG [41] is calculated as follows.
hl = H(Ul) (2)
hi = H(Ui ‖ hi+1), i = l − 1, . . . , 2, 1 (3)
hG = H(h1 ‖ Gid ‖ Vid) (4)
where Gid is the identification of group G, Vid is the identi-
fication of the codestream (e.g., video number), and its MAC
is
σG = H(hG, kTid) (5)
where kTid is the shared key between the center and train Tid.
Finally, σG is inserted into the Auxiliary payload field of
the first Non-VCL NALU Γ of group G, and the entire
codestream of group G is ready for broadcasting to all
the APs via any high-speed network (e.g., fiber network).
Thus, similar to the format-compliant encryption scheme
[29], the present scheme produces protected codestream
which is complaint with original codestream format. As
the number of trains is small, the communication overhead for
all the σG is small too. Especially, as only the authenticated
token σG for the passing-by train is transmitted over WiFi
networks, the WiFi communication overhead is merely one
MAC for each group.
4) Truncating codestream at AP: In video broadcast ap-
plications, codestream data are usually transmitted with the
non-reliable and non-retransmission UDP mode. To deal with
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the transmission non-reliability, a common practice is that the
sender adopts video codestream optimization techniques such
as truncating given that the video is encoded at a flexible
bitrate [42].
In the subway system, the WiFi quality varies with train
location, speed and surround situation. To have an optimal
quality of service, AP will properly select the FEC and WiFi
bitrate (See Subsection IV-B for details). If there are several
passing-by trains around an AP, the AP will broadcast the
smallest codestream bitrate such that all the trains can verify
their received codestreams.
Clearly, if the truncated codestream is directly delivered
over a WiFi network, it will definitely be rejected by the
receiver. In order to prove that the truncated codestream is
really a portion of the original one, the AP will calculate an
authentication token e
hl = H(Ul) (6)
hi = H(Ui ‖ hi+1) i = l − 1, . . . , u+ 1 (7)
e = hu+1 (8)
and insert e into NALU Γ.
5) Verifying codestream at train: The verification process
basically reverses the generation process for a protected video
group. Concretely, after receiving NALUs Uˆj (j = 1, . . . , u)
and NALU Γ including eˆ and σˆG, the train calculates
h˜u = H(Uˆu ‖ eˆ) (9)
h˜i = H(Uˆi ‖ h˜i+1) i = u− 1, . . . , 2, 1 (10)
h˜G = H(h˜1 ‖ Gid ‖ Vid) (11)
If and only if σˆG = H(h˜G, kTid), the train confirms that the
received (truncated if any) group G is authenticated.
In order to offer authenticity of the received codestream
if there is no attack, the WiFi communication channel shall
be sufficiently reliable. In general, the larger the distance
between WiFi AP and train, the worse their signal strength and
reliability [43]. Meanwhile, in the subway environment, WiFi
signal strength is also affected by the path between transmitter
and receiver [44], and dynamic train movement [45]. All these
factors make the quality of on-board rendered video instable.
To fill in the gap, the following sections will improve the QoS
with the on-board sensors.
IV. SITUATION-AWARE OPTIMIZATION OF
AUTHENTICATED VIDEO BROADCASTING
In video broadcasting applications, QoS of received code-
stream is related to WiFi data rate. As a suitable data rate
should be selected according to many physical variables such
as WiFi RSSI, train location, train speed etc, real-time mea-
suring and sharing of the variables play an important role.
A. Real-time situational measurement
In a subway system, distance sensors are used to measure
train’s speed and/or position for continuously calculating the
safe separation distance between neighboring trains. The sen-
sors, typically include wheel angular speed sensors, Doppler
radars, accelerometers, and gyroscopes. For instance, SCMT
(Sistema di Controllo Marcia Treno) for Italian railways
measures the wheel angular speed to estimate train speed by
counting the impulses generated from a sensor per second and
calculates the travel distance [46]–[48].
Whenever a train obtains its real-time position, speed mea-
surement, etc, it sends them to the train center, and receives
the confirmation commands from the center via train-trackside
communication devices. In a railway transportation system,
it is critical for safety to share the real-time measurements
among the neighboring trains. If the measurements are inac-
curate or delayed, collision tragedy may happen [49].
In addition, the WiFi signal strength RSSI can be measured
with the communication module in real time by AP and train
independently [50].
B. Situation-aware WiFi Data-rate and FEC
As an AP knows RSSI of the AP-train WiFi connectivity,
train location and speed, it roughly knows the bit error
probability p of the WiFi communication with the passing-
by train. Given that the error distribution is uniform, the AP
calculates a set
Si =
{
(ri, n, k, t)
∣∣∣∣∣∃E(n, k, t), n ≤ riαfG , k ≥ β, t ≥ np
}
(12)
by testing FEC E(n, k, t) one by one for each WiFi data
rate ri specified in IEEE 802.11 standard, where n is the
transmitted codestream size, k is the actual codestream size,
t is the number of tolerable errors in bits, fG is the number
of groups per second, α ∈ [0.7, 1) is a conservation factor
due to network header, IP header etc, and β is the predefined
minimal codestream size to ensure the basic video quality.
As there are only thousands of FEC of suitable sizes,
it is easy to store their parameters into a data array in
advance. As a result, the solution to Eq.(12) can be quickly
found by searching the small data array for each data rate
ri. Moreover, as the number R of specified WiFi data rate
is also small, AP is able to quickly choose the highest actual
codestream rate. i.e., AP chooses the tuple for WiFi date rate
rm and error correction code (nm, km, tm) as
(rm, nm, km, tm) = arg max
1≤i≤R
{
rk
n
∣∣∣∣∣(r, n, k, t) ∈
⋃
Si
}
(13)
Afterwards, the AP will choose the important NATUs Ui
(1 ≤ i ≤ u) from the target SVC group, such that the size of
all the selected NALUs as km. Then, the AP will encode all
the important NALUs into a codeword nm, and discard the
unimportant NATUs Ui (u+ 1 ≤ i ≤ l).
C. Situation-aware Handover
When a train moves along a rail, its AP has to change from
time to time. Although IEEE 802.11f IAPP (Inter-Access Point
Protocol)1 and the new standard MIH (Media Independent
Information Handover) [51]–[53] might achieve fast handover
1IEEE 802 Executive Committee approved IAPP withdrawal on February 3,
2006 (http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/802/11/Reports/802.11 Timelines.htm).
2327-4662 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/JIOT.2018.2859185, IEEE
Internet of Things Journal
6 IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, VOL. XX, NO. XX, MONTH YEAR
and hence increase the QoS, they are not adopted in this paper
because they require to change the infrastructure and hence are
not applicable to the legacy subway systems.
In the period of AP handover, the train may miss some code-
stream packets such that the QoS is reduced. The handover
process consists of three phases: scanning AP, authentication
of moving station and association between new AP and
the moving object, where the scanning AP may cost 80%
handover time, or up to 400ms [54]. In order to select the
proper handover time, we shall take into consideration of the
following factors.
1) Train location: IEEE 802.11b specifies three indepen-
denlt WiFi channels, hence it is valuable to configure two
neighbor APs with different channels. On the one hand,
the interference between two neighboring AP is significantly
reduced. On the other hand, as the train knows the locations
of the APs, it knows the channel frequency of the next AP
based on its measured location. Therefore, the scanning time
for handover is reduced to 0. However, as the train localization
sensor is inaccurate [40], and the connectivity quality varies
from time to time, the train location measurement can be used
to grossly determine the handover time only.
2) WiFi connectivity RSSI: RSSI is an important indicator
for connectivity quality. Although the train-AP distance is a
major factor on RSSI, some other factors such as iron bridge,
tunnel, interference from passing-by train, and moving speed
may have impact on RSSI too. For instance, Fig.6 shows
that RSSI decreases with train-AP distance in general, and
fluctuates considerably during mobility. Hence, when a train
approaches to a predefined location region, it checks whether
RSSI of the WiFi channel between the train and the old AP
is sufficiently low. If positive, the train can start the handover
process.
Fig. 6. RSSI vs distance between communication peers [55]. The experiments
in [56] also demonstrate the variance of RSSI. RSSI representation varies with
the communication chip.
3) Codestream group: The handover strategies in subsec-
tion V-B consider the connectivity smoothness, rather than
content smoothness. In video broadcast applications, although
all the APs receive the same packets broadcast from the
center, they do not forward the packets to the passing-by
trains simultaneously due to their difference in processor
performance, configuration etc. Thus, some broadcast packets
may be unavoidably lost in the handover process. Even worse,
some other packets which depends on the missed packets are
unable to be decoded and have to be discarded, such that the
video quality decreases a lot.
Fig.7 shows an example sequence of packets being sent
from AP1 and AP2, where AP1 broadcasts video packets
earlier than AP2. If the train passes AP1 first and AP2 later,
it is able to handover as mentioned in Subsection V-B without
missing packets/NALUs. Instead, it may receive redundant
packets/NALUs which can be discarded or used to correct
errors. On the contrary, if the train passes over AP2 first and
AP1 later, some NALUs/packets are not received from either
old AP2, or new AP1.
AP1:   P11   P12   P13 … …  P1a P21   P22  P23 … …  P2b
AP2:       …       …      P11   P12 P13 … …  P1a   P21   P22  P23 … …  P2b
            
 Z 
time
Fig. 7. Refined handover time by considering AP desynchronization.
In order to ensure the effect of the visual experience, the
handover time should be refined based on NALU priority or
IP packet priority as shown in Fig.5. When the train decides
to handover, it will not receive the packet with lower priority
from the old AP any more, but the packet with higher priority
from the new AP. For example, with reference to Fig.7, when
the connectivity is about to transfer from AP2 to AP1, the train
shall handover before the time of receiving packet P13 sent
from AP2 so as to receive packet P21 sent from AP1, as packet
P21 has higher priority than packet P13. In this example, the
train has two handover time options: at the time of completely
receiving P11 or P12. Clearly, the second option is preferable
as one more packet (i.e., P11) is received for better QoS.
D. Situation-aware Antenna Switching
The smart handover schemes addressed in Subsection V-B
enable to guarantee the QoS at a proper handover time.
However, they are not helpful in performance improvement at
the rest of communication time. Specifically, when the distance
d between AP and train antenna is far, the quality is low
according to the model RSSI = −16.838 log10 d−59.0668 in
dBm [55]. As shown in Fig.8, if the distance d > 30 meters,
the signal RSSI < −80dBm, the error probability is high.
Hence many off-the-shelf products requires RSSI < −80
dBm for good performance.
To reduce the packet error probability and improve the video
quality, a straightforward solution is to add more trackside
APs. As installing more APs means higher cost and more WiFi
interference, it is not widely adopted. Instead, it is preferable
to install multiple-antenna on a train [57]. In this case, if the
train antenna interval is
Da ≤ 2×DAP (14)
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blind area
                                                 
Fig. 8. RSSI changes between two access points and hand-over parameters.
There may be a “blind” area between two APs.
where DAP is the coverage of an AP, at least one train
antenna is within the coverage of an AP, and the interference
between neighboring APs may be very small. For example,
in Singapore’s Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) North East Line, a
train length is above 80 meters. Suppose that the AP coverage
DAP is 20m, Da = 40m is a good option for the train
antenna interval. In other words, it is sufficient that each train
is installed with 3 antennas at train head, middle and tail
respectively.
Although a multiple-antenna scheme is able to offer high
signal level, its importance may decrease significantly without
proper multiple-antenna switch process. In the present scheme,
based on its location and routine path, a train knows that it
enters into the coverage of a new AP, it tunes to the channel
of the new AP. When the train travels 2DAP , it checks the
RSSI. If it is below some threshold (e.g., -80dBm), it will
switch to the second antenna which are connected with train
communication networks [58], and so on.
V. DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we assume that the distance between any
two neighboring APs is constant (e.g., 200 meters in some
real subway video systems). The communication speed of the
backbone network comprising AP and center is sufficiently
fast and hence backbone network delay is ignored. Let video
frame rate be 25 frames per second, α = 70%, β = 384kbps2
(Common Intermediate Format or CIF3 for short) and each
group includes 25 frames, i.e., fG = 1 group per second, and
FEC BCH [59] E(n, k, t) is chosen.
A. Security Analysis
The authentication scheme employs a one-way hash func-
tion to protect each NALU, hence any adversary is unable
2Train Communication Network (TCN) connects the on-board train devices.
It includes Multifunction Vehicle Bus (MVB) (1.5 Mbps) for the device of a
car or car group, and wire train bus (WTB) (1 Mbps) for interconnected cars
[58]. Hence, we assume that the video codestream rate is 384kbps.
3The present scheme is also applicable to high-bitrate video stream as
the overhead is merely a very small percentage of the total traffic (Please
refer to Subsection V-B).
to tamper with the NALUs at the transmission path from the
center to the train. Even if the adversary is able to tamper with
the APs, the video codestream can not be changed without
being identified by the train. Specifically, assume that an
attacker is able to fake a (truncated if any) group codestream Gˇ
including NALUs {Uˇi}, patch eˇ and MAC σGˇ, and an innocent
train can not identify whether Gˇ is bogus or not. It means that
the attacker is able to ensure
σGˇ = H(hGˇ, kTid) (15)
That is to say, the adversary is able to create a new MAC σGˇ
without knowing the secret kTid. Thus, the above assumption
does not hold.
A second possible attack strategy is that the attacker is able
to fake a group such that hG = hGˇ. If the strategy is possible,
the adversary must be able to prepare the new group Gˇ and eˇ
such that
hˇu = H(Uˇu ‖ eˇ) (16)
hˇi = H(Uˇi ‖ hˇi+1) i = u− 1, . . . , 2, 1 (17)
hG = hGˇ = H(hˇ1 ‖ Gid ‖ Vid) (18)
According to the one-wayness property of H(·), it is impos-
sible to find the pair (Gˇ, eˇ) unless it is generated according to
Subsection III-C4.
A third one is counterfeiting attack which combines groups
of different codestreams [60]. Nonetheless, as group identifi-
cation Gid and codestream ID Vid are inserted into Eq.(4), this
counterfeiting attack can not be launched either.
B. FEC and Bitrate selection
When there are errors in the codestream, some regions of
the decoded frames may include mosaic blocks. Furthermore,
the errors will be propagated to their dependencies such that
the video quality is decreased to cause bad perception feeling.
Therefore, FEC shall be employed to improve the QoS.
When the codestream is distributed over an Ethernet net-
work, each IP packet may be over 1000 bytes. As it is time-
consuming to decode/encode a long codeword, the codestream
in a group is divided into chunks and encode/decode chunk
by chunk in practice. With regard to Eq.(12), for some integer
l, we have 

n = 2l − 1
n− k ≤ lt
n ≤ αrfG = 0.7r
k ≥ β = 384× 103
t ≥ np
(19)
according to BCH.
To solve Eq.(19), the AP tries r = 2Mbps, assume that
network bit error4 p = 7 × 10−4 for some train location and
4As it is hard to find an existing wireless error probability formula
in a subway environment and perform the test experiments, we adopt a
conservative method which assumes the bit error here is about as 10 times as
bit errors (7.4428 × 10−5) in [61] for the purpose of explanation here.
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speed. Therefore, Eq.(19) can be rewritten as

nm = 2
lm − 1
nm − km ≤ lmtm
nm ≤ 0.7r = 0.7× 2× 10
6
km ≥ β = 384× 10
3 × nmr = 0.192nm
tm ≥ 0.0007nm
(20)
By searching the BCH codebook, the AP can choose lm = 10,
nm = 2
lm − 1 = 1023, tm ≥ 0.0007n ≈ 1, km = 1013,
i.e., BCH E(1023, 1013, 1) is used to encode each 1013-bit
codestream chunk. As a result, the received codestream rate
is about αrfG ×
km
nm
= 0.7 × 2 × 106 × 1013
1023
≈ 1.386 × 106,
or about 1.386Mbps, which is sufficient for most rendering
devices in trains. That is to say, data rate r = 2 Mbps is
suboptimal and viable. Optionally, the AP can solve Eq.(19) by
trying other WiFi data rate if it demands better QoS. When the
FECs is BCH E(1023, 1013, 1), the communication overhead
is approximately 1% (≈ 1023−1013
1013
).
C. Group Authentication Rate
Given that the WiFi transmission rate is 1.386 Mbps, and
each group has 1.386 Mbits as the period is 1 second. Suppose
the WiFi Ethernet packet size is 1023 bytes, the number of
packets in a group is about 170 (≈ 1386000/(1023× 8)).
According to the experiments in [61], if there is no error
correcting code, the rate of received packets is 93.6%, or 6.4%
packet loss rate on average. When each packet is embedded
with error correcting code BCH E(1023, 1013, 1), and each
codeblock has the independent error, each codeblock is re-
ceived at the rate of b0 = (0.9361/8+1023×7.4438×10−6)8
= 99.5%. Then the loss rate of FEC packets is 0.5% only.
If the authenticator (MAC σG and e) is piggybacked on c
packets uniformly distributed over the group, the loss probabil-
ity of the authentication packet is Ac = (0.005)c. For instance,
A1 = 0.5%, A2 = 2.5 × 10
−5
. In spite of the improvement
of the video quality, some groups of the codestream will
not be fully received correctly and hence fail the codestream
verification.
Remark 1: According to Subsection IV-C3, a train may
ignore the unimportant NALUs of the old AP, but accept the
important packets from the new AP at the handover time.
Hence, the authenticity may fail at the handover time. This
case is known to the train and hence has minor impact on the
authenticity of video content.
D. Codestream buffering
As the train-AP connectivity strength varies over time, the
highest data rate fluctuates accordingly. Thus if the actual
AP throughput rate ra is higher than codestream rate rc,
codestream buffering is a viable solution to ensure the stability
of codestream bitrate. Specifically, when the WiFi connectivity
between train and AP is excellent, the AP broadcasts the
codetream at a high data rate such that the train is able to store
some codestream for rendering later. Its disadvantage is that
the video rendering may be delayed for some time. In other
words, codestream buffering aims for the trade-off between
real-time and QoS.
As an illustrative example, the distance between two IEEE
802.11b APs in subway is 200m, then trave time between two
APs is 20s. Assume that the subway train moves at a constant
speed 10m/s or 36km/h, and the WiFi data rate (in million bits
per second) is simply selected with the distance d (in meter)
between WiFi AP and train antenna.
Table I is the data sheet for codestream transmission, where
the first column is the distance between train and AP, the
second column is the WiFi data rate selected based on the
first column, the third column (the forth column) is the
transmission time (amount resp.) when the WiFi AP transmits
the codestream at the data rate in the second column, while
the last column is the amount of bitstream sent by the AP in
total.
As the AP sends 39 Mbits codestream to the passing-by
train within 20 seconds, the average rate is 1.95Mbps which
meets the specification of the 4CIF (4 × Common Intermediate
Format) @25frames per second. Hence, the datarate switching
strategy works. However, when the data-rate of AP is selected
to be higher than the codestream bitrate, some codestream
shall be prepared in advance. For instance, if the datarate
is 11Mbps and the codestream bitrate is 1.5Mbps, the data
transmitted in 2 seconds will be rendered within 11 × 2/1.9
= 11.5 seconds. In other words, some codestream data will
be stored in the buffer and delayed about 10 seconds for
rendering.
TABLE I
DATA SHEET FOR IEEE 802.11B RATE SWITCHING, SINGLE ANTENNA
Distance Data-rate Transmission Amount Total
|d| (Mbps) time(s) (Mbit) (Mbit)
[0,10] 11 2 22 22
(10, 20] 5.5 2 11 33
(20, 30] 2 2 4 37
(30, 40] 1 2 2 39
(40, 100] 0 12 0 39
Suppose the length of the train is 80 meters, and two
antennas are installed on the train head and tail. Then Table
I will be updated to Table II. As the train is able to receive
78Mbits codestream from each AP, the admissible codestream
bitrate is 3.8Mbps. If the bitrate is still 1.5Mbps, the rendering
delay can be reduced to 5 seconds.
TABLE II
DATA SHEET FOR IEEE 802.11B RATE SWITCHING, DOUBLE ANTENNAS
Distance Data-rate Transmission Amount Total
|d| (Mbps) time(s) (Mbit) (Mbit)
[0,10] 11 4 44 44
(10, 20] 5.5 4 22 66
(20, 30] 2 4 8 74
(30, 40] 1 4 4 78
(40, 100] 0 4 0 78
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TABLE III
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
Scheme Authenticity rate Quality of service Mobility Adaptation Computation Traffic overhead
[32] Middle Nil No No High Middle
[38] Nil Middle Yes No Low Nil
Present High High Yes Yes Low Low
E. Comparison
As the subway video broadcast systems are usually pro-
prietary of the vendors, few technical details are publicly
accessible. In this Section, we compare the representative of
mobile TV technology [38] and video streaming authentication
technology [32] with the presented situation-aware trusted
video scheme.
As shown in Table III, the second column lists the au-
thenticity rate which is the ratio between authenticated data
and received data if there is no attack. Scheme [38] does not
addresses the video authenticity, but video quality only. As
scheme [32] is a streaming authentication without considering
the network performance, hence its authenticity rate is subject
to the packet loss rate.
In the third column, scheme [38] employs FEC to pro-
vide packet loss resilience, but the FEC is static rather than
adaptive. It can not remain high QoS in all the situations.
Scheme [32] assumes that packet loss rate is known for the
participants, and ignore the QoS. In the present scheme, the
FEC and network bitrate are adaptively tuned, therefore, the
QoS is always high.
Column 4 shows that scheme [32] ignores the mobility
application where AP handover is necessary, while column
5 indicates that only the present scheme is adaptive in terms
of the wireless signal strength, location etc.
In column 6, the computation cost states the computation
resource used for the purpose of authenticity and FEC. As
the present scheme adopts the symmetric key system, hence
its computational cost is low at the center, AP and train, in
comparison with scheme [32] which adopts asymmetric key
cryptographic primitives.
In the last column, the traffic overhead means the number
of bytes is added to the WiFi traffic so as to offer authenticity.
Although the overhead of the present scheme is linear with the
number of passing-by trains, it is small because the number
of trains linking to the same AP is no more than 3 in practice.
As MAC is usually much smaller than a digital signature, the
present scheme incurs low communication overhead.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Live video programmes can bring in not only better trave
experience for the subway passengers, but also extra income
for the subway operators. Nonetheless, as unprotected video
programmes might be changed by the adversary, deadly riot
may happen on the subway trains. By exploiting the legacy
sensors of subway, this paper presents a video streaming
method which ensures high quality of service and authenticity.
Due to the restriction on the railway infrastructure, it is
not easy to evaluate the present scheme in a real railway
environment. Instead, it will be possible to perform simulation
with some vehicles in a residential area, where the APs can
be installed together with the street lights. When the vehicle
moves along the road and reports to the center its locations
and speed, the AP will broadcast the video according to the
proposed scheme. With the received codestream, the vehicle
is able to verify the authenticity and evaluate the QoS.
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